





How a Leakage of Human Capital
Lubricates the Engine of Economic Growth
by
Gerhard Sorger, Oded Stark und Yong Wang





Migration and Dynamics: How a Leakage of Human Capital 
































a Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, 1010 Vienna, Austria. 
E-mail: gerhard.sorger@univie.ac.at 
 
b Corresponding author 
ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, D-53113 Bonn, Germany.  
E-mail: ostark@uni-bonn.de 
 
c Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, 
Kowloon, Hong Kong, China. 
E-mail: EFYWANG@cityu.edu.hk 






This paper studies the growth dynamics of a developing country under migration. Assuming 
that human capital formation is subject to a strong enough, positive intertemporal externality, 
the prospect of migration will increase growth in the home country in the long run. If the 
external effect is less strong, there exists at least a level effect on the stock of human capital 
in the home country. In either case, the home country experiences a welfare gain, provided 
that migration is sufficiently restrictive. These results, obtained in a dynamic general 
equilibrium setting, extend and strengthen the results of Stark and Wang (2002) obtained in 
the context of a static model.  
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1. Introduction  
In an earlier paper, Stark and Wang (2002) presented a new paradigm in the study of the 
effects of the migration of skilled workers. Stark and Wang (2002) argued that the prospect of 
migration from a developing country to a developed, technologically advanced country 
changes not only the set of opportunities that individuals in the developing country face, but 
also the structure of the incentives that they confront: higher prospective returns to human 
capital in the developed country induce more human capital formation in the developing 
country. In particular, they showed that an improvement in the incentives that govern the 
decision to acquire human capital can lead not only to an increase in the human capital that 
individuals choose to form but also, under certain conditions, to a welfare gain for all, 
migrants and non-migrants alike. However, the static framework employed in Stark and Wang 
(2002) fell short of informing us whether the human capital gain can be the harbinger of long-
term economic growth. This is the subject of the present paper. 
 
We develop an overlapping-generations growth model and investigate the associated 
dynamic general equilibrium. We proceed in four steps. First, we derive the long-run steady 
state in a small open economy with free international capital flows, but without the possibility 
of migration. We show that this steady state is characterized by a constant level of human 
capital and a constant growth rate of output which, in turn, is equal to the exogenous growth 
rate of the population.  
 
Second, we study growth dynamics when the individuals in the home country face a 
strictly positive probability of migrating to a destination country where the returns to their 
human capital are higher than at home. The higher expected wage rate yielded by the 
prospect of migration induces the individuals to acquire more human capital. In our model, 
human capital formation is subject to a positive intertemporal externality beyond some 
threshold level. We show that the size of the spillover effect of the current human capital on 
future productivity plays an important role in determining the long-run growth effect of the 
prospect of migration. When the spillover effect is sufficiently strong, the prospect of 
migration results in a higher growth rate of the home country in the long run; however, a 
weak enough, or a complete absence of, a spillover effect will lead to only a level increase in 
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human capital, with a reduction of the growth rate in the long run.1 
 
Third, we conduct a welfare analysis, looking at the wellbeing of the individuals who 
stay behind in the home country. When the workforce is homogeneous, these individuals too 
have responded (ex ante) to the migration-conferred incentive to acquire more human capital, 
yet ended up (ex post) not subjecting their improved human capital to the higher pay 
environment abroad. Provided that migration is restricted, the long-run growth gain translates 
into a welfare gain. Moreover, even if there is no long-run growth gain, a welfare gain is still 
possible under restrictive migration policies, just as originally demonstrated in Stark and 
Wang (2002) in the context of a static model.  
 
Finally, in step four we demonstrate that our findings are robust to the introduction of 
heterogeneity of skill levels. Specifically, we assume that individuals may differ in their 
ability to form human capital, and that only the highly skilled individuals, who in equilibrium 
acquire more human capital than the low-skill individuals, face a prospect of migration. 
Despite the negative effect caused by the migration of such individuals, a growth gain as well 
as a resulting welfare gain in the home country can still materialize. 
 
2. Human capital formation and economic growth: the (benchmark) economy without 
 migration 
Consider a small open economy without migration. The economy consists of 
overlapping-generations, with each generation consisting, in turn, of homogenous individuals 
whose lives can be divided into two periods. The population grows at a (gross) rate 0>n . 
Each member of each generation acquires human capital in the first period of his life 
(“youth”). In the second period of his life (“old age”) the member works, repays the loan that 
he took to finance the human capital investment, procreates (at the rate n ), and consumes.  
                                                 
1 The idea that migration might lead to higher growth through some sort of an intertemporal spillover effect on 
productivity has been suggested, but not explicitly studied, by Mountford (1997). It is noteworthy that in 
contrast to Mountford (1997), who focuses on the possibility of migration resulting in some long-run level 
effects on human capital accumulation and on output for the home country, we study in the present paper the 
long-run growth as well as welfare effects of migration. Stark et al. (1998) have also referred to the positive 
externalities that the probability of migration could confer upon the home country. 
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More specifically, in each period a young individual undertakes educational investment 
which is financed by borrowing from a perfect capital market, where the prevailing world 
(gross) interest rate is 0>R . An old individual works, supplying inelastically the human 
capital which he acquired during his youth. Let 
t
e  be the amount of educational investment, 
financed by borrowing, of a young individual in period t, and let 1+th  be the resulting level of 
human capital available to the individual in the subsequent period 1t + . We assume that the 
production function of human capital is a product of two terms: the young individual’s own 
educational investment, and the human capital level of the old (parent) generation. Because 
within a given generation individuals are identical,2 the prevailing average level of human 
capital is the same as an old individual’s level of human capital. Formally, we assume that 
 
βα
ttt heh =+1 ,      (1) 
 
where α and β are positive parameters satisfying α + β < 1 (that is, the production function 
of human capital exhibits decreasing returns to scale). The incorporation of th  in (1) 
emanates from the assumption that the prevailing (average) level of human capital creates an 
environment that facilitates human capital formation for any given level of educational 
investment. The prevailing level of human capital thus acts as a contemporaneous pulling up 
externality.3  
 
The output produced in the economy in period t, tY , is given by 
 
ttt HAY = ,      (2) 
 
where Ht is the aggregate human capital in the economy (the sum of the levels of human 
capital of all the old individuals), and where At is a productivity factor. We assume that the 
productivity factor is subject to a threshold externality in the spirit of Azariadis and Drazen 
                                                 
2 The case of heterogeneous individuals is studied in Section 5. 
3 Similar production functions of human capital are quite standard in the relevant literature. See, for example, 
Lucas (1988), Galor and Stark (1994), and Glomm and Ravikumar (2001). The restriction 1<+ βα  is helpful 
in obtaining a steady state for the human capital dynamics. 
4 
 
(1990), that is, 
 
),( 1−= tt hfA  
     (3) 
 


























where A , h , and ρ  are positive parameters. The parameter ρ is a measure of the impact of 
the intertemporal externality of human capital on productivity when the level of human 
capital is above the threshold level of human capital h . Thus, the productivity factor is a 
continuous function of the average level of human capital in the economy, 1−th . It is constant 
for average human capital levels below some threshold level, h , and it depends positively on 
1−th  beyond this threshold level.
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Before proceeding, we summarize the parameter restrictions imposed thus far.  
 
Assumption 1: The parameters α , β , ρ , n , A , h , and R  are strictly positive, and it holds 
that 1<+ βα . 
 
Let Lt be the size of the economy’s labor force (the number of the old individuals) in 
period t, and let Nt be the size of the continuum of the young individuals born in period t. 
Then, Lt+1 = t tN nL= . Denote by tw  the returns to human capital (the wage rate per unit of 
human capital) in period t. From (2) it follows that tt Aw = . Denoting by 1tc +  the 
consumption in period 1t +  of an individual born in period t , the individual solves the 
following problem: 
                                                 
4 Here it is assumed that the total productivity at time t is affected by the average level of human capital of the 
preceding period 1−t . Our analysis will go through if, instead, we were to assume that total productivity 







⋅−= +++ 111max  
 
























++ = ttt hRwh     (6) 
 
From equation (5) it follows that consumption is non-negative, even though we did not 
impose this as a constraint. This property implies that the individuals are able to survive after 
fully repaying their loans.  
 
Because 11 ++ = tt Aw , substituting (3) into (6) we obtain the transition dynamics of 
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h , that is, 
the first and second segments of the human capital transition dynamics in (7), respectively. It 
is easy to see that the dynamics represented by )(⋅φ , which is a concave function, 




)1/(* )/( βααα −−= RAh .      (8) 
On the other hand, the function )(⋅ϕ  can display varied shapes and the corresponding 
dynamics may have different properties, depending on parameter configurations (in particular 
the size of ρ ). Specifically, defining βραη ++≡ )1( , we have that )(⋅ϕ is concave if 1<η , 
convex if 1>η , and linear if 1=η . Furthermore, as long as 1≠η , )(⋅ϕ  has a unique steady 
state at 
 
)1/(** )/( ηαρα −= hRAh ,      (9) 
 
which is stable under the dynamics )(1 tt hh ϕ=+  if )(⋅ϕ  is concave ( 1<η ), and unstable if 
)(⋅ϕ  is convex ( 1>η ). 
 
In order to flesh out our main argument, we make the following assumption.5 
 
Assumption 2: It holds that )1/()/( βααα −−> RAh . 
 
This assumption means that the threshold level of human capital at which the 
intertemporal externality in productivity takes effect is relatively high. In such a case, the 
economy will be approaching the steady state of human capital given by (8), *h , from all 
initial human capital stocks smaller than h  (and also from many others). Hence, the economy 
is prevented from taking off to a path of persistent growth. The following lemma 
substantiates this intuition. 
 
Lemma 1: The average human capital in the closed economy converges to *h , either for any 
initial level of human capital 0h  if 1≤η , or for 
)1/(
0 )/(
ηαρα −< hRAh  if 1>η .  
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
The phase diagram of the human capital dynamics is illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                 
5 In Appendix B we show that the qualitative results of the ensuing analysis carry over to the complementary 




[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
It follows from Lemma 1 that, barring the exceptional case with a rather high level of 
initial human capital and a large intertemporal externality,6 the level of human capital in the 
closed economy will converge to hh <* , and hence, the productivity of the human capital At 
will be constant at the level of A in the long run. For sufficiently large t, the (gross) rate of 






+++++ ==== tttttttttttt hRAnhnhhLAhLAYYg  
 
where the last equality in the displayed expression follows from (7) for hht < . Because th  
converges to *h , which is given by (8), the growth rate of the aggregate output converges to 
the steady state growth rate n, that is, *tg g n→ =  for t → ∞ , which is the (gross) rate of 
population growth. In other words, in per capita terms, the growth rate of output converges to 
zero in the long run. 
 
In sum: our analysis shows that the benchmark economy without migration converges 
to a long-run equilibrium with the average (per member of the population) level of human 
capital given by (8), and with output growing at the population growth rate n. In particular, in 
the closed economy, the human capital formed by the individuals will be “trapped” below the 
threshold level h  in the long run. The potential pull of the human capital externality on 
productivity will not come into play and consequently, as diminishing returns take over, 
growth is muted in the long run. 
 
3. Human capital formation and economic growth: the economy with migration 
For each and every generation, let there be a strictly positive probability, p, of migrating 
                                                 
6 It is clear from the proof of Lemma 1 and Figure 1 that for the closed economy to escape the “trap” of *h , it is 
necessary that 1>η and hhh >>
**
20  hold. Given our focus on the perspective of a developing economy, 
throughout this paper we disregard this exceptional case which requires an initial level of human capital that is 
conceivably far too high.   
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to a foreign country in the second period of an individual’s life.7 Thus, an individual born in 
period t faces a probability p of obtaining in the foreign country returns to human capital, 
*
1tw + , that are higher than at home: 
*
1tw + > 1+tw . Taking this prospect of migration in the 








max 111 ⋅−= +++  
 
subject to (1) and
 
0~ 1 ≥+tc , where 
*
1 1 1 1(1 )t t t tw p w pw w A+ + + += − + > ≥ , and where a tilde 
represents the level of a variable under migration. We will momentarily add assumptions in 
order to ensure that this optimization problem has an interior solution at which the non-




























++ = ttt hRwh .     (12) 
 
A comparison of (10) with (4), and of (12) with (6) unravels the static inducement 
effect of migration on human capital formation, studied in Stark and Wang (2002): the higher 
expected wage rate yielded by the prospect of migration induces individuals to invest more in 
human capital formation ( tt ee >
~ ) and, correspondingly, the level of human capital formed in 
the economy is higher ( 11
~
++ > tt hh ). We next show that the prospect of migration, which 
translates into an improvement of total productivity, can give rise to yet another, dynamic 
gain in the long run. 
                                                 
7 As we note later on, our main results carry through even when the prospect of migration avails itself only for a 




For the sake of tractability and to concentrate on essentials, we will not model the 
determination of the foreign wage rate but assume, instead, that in each period t the foreign 
wage rate is equal to a multiple of the domestic wage rate: *t tw wκ= , where 1>κ  is a 
constant. Thus, under migration, the expected returns to human capital are given by 
*
1 1 1 1(1 )t t t tw p w pw wκ+ + + += − + = , where 11 >+−≡ κκ pp . Using (10) and (12) we find 








++ −= ttttt wwhRwc αα
αβαα     (13) 
 










++ −= ttttt wwhRwc αα
αβαα .    (14) 
 
It follows that 0~ 1 ≥+tc  holds with probability 1 provided that 0)1( 111 ≥−=− +++ ttt www καα , 
which, in turn, is satisfied as long as 01 ≥− κα . This assumption, which means that either 
the foreign wage is not too high as compared to the domestic wage (that is, κ  is sufficiently 
close to 1) or that the probability of migration is sufficiently small (that is, p  is sufficiently 
close to 0), will therefore be maintained for the remainder of our analysis. We collect our 
assumptions on p  and κ  as follows. 
 
Assumption 3: The parameters p  and κ  satisfy 10 << p , 1>κ , and ακ /11 ≤+− pp . 
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respectively. The transition function of human capital under migration is represented by an 
upward shift ( 1>κ ) of the transition function of human capital without migration. 
Consequently, the dynamic properties of human capital formation in the economy with 
migration crucially depend on the size of this shift, as determined by the magnitude of the 
parameter κ . Similarly to the case of the closed economy, we have that )(
~
⋅φ  is a concave 
function and that all the solutions of )(
~
1 tt hh φ=+  converge monotonically to the unique 
steady state at 
 
)1/(* )/(
~ βαακα −−= RAh .     (16) 
 
On the other hand, the function )(~ ⋅ϕ  can display various shapes, depending on the parameter 
η . As long as 1≠η , )(~ ⋅ϕ  yields a unique steady state at 
 
)1/(** )/(
~ ηαρκα −= hRAh ,      (17) 
 
which is stable under the dynamics )(~1 tt hh ϕ=+  if 1<η , and unstable if 1>η . Once again, 
for the sake of fleshing out our main argument, we resort to an assumption. 
 
Assumption 4: It holds that hRA >−− )1/()/( βαακα . 
 
Under Assumption 4, starting from any initial level of human capital hh <0 , the static 
inducement effect as proxied by κ  is strong enough to lift the level of human capital above 
the threshold level h  along the transition function )(
~
⋅φ . Then, due to the intertemporal 
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externality, the amplified productivity factor will further alter the future trajectory of the 
human capital accumulation dynamics and thereupon, the growth path of the economy. 
Because the average level of human capital will cross the threshold level of human capital h  
at some point in time, we may assume, without loss of generality, that the transition dynamics 
of human capital is given by )(~ ⋅ϕ  in every period, as per the second segment of (15) for 
hht ≥
~
. The following result then obtains.  
 
Lemma 2: The level of human capital formed by a young individual under migration will 
grow without bounds iff 1)1( ≥++= βραη , and it will converge to the constant level **
~
h  
in (17), where hh >**
~
, iff 1<η . 
 
Proof: Let us define )1/()/( αακα −= RAM . Then we can rewrite )(
~




~ αβφ −= tt hMh , 










thφ  is a strictly concave function 
with a unique fixed point at *
~





φ . Thus, we can find 0>ε  such that hh )1()(
~
εφ +> . In the case where 












1 εφϕ +>≥=+  
 
holds for all hht >
~
. This proves that whenever 1≥η  and the human capital stock has grown 
beyond the threshold level h , it continues to grow without bound. However, when 1<η , 
)
~
(~ thϕ  is a strictly concave function that intersects the 45 degree line to the right of h  at 
**~
h  
as specified in (17) (because hhh >= )(
~
)(~ φϕ ). It is easily seen that in this case th
~
 must 
converge to that steady state value.  
 
The human capital dynamics under migration, as given in (15), is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The impact of the intertemporal externality of human capital on productivity when the 
level of human capital is above the threshold level of human capital h  (an impact captured 
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by the parameter ρ) cannot be realized in the absence of migration in the benchmark economy 
because the human capital dynamics is trapped below the threshold level h . The presence of 
the prospect of migration thus unlocks this potential intertemporal externality by lifting the 
human capital stock above the threshold level h . Lemma 2 highlights the possibility that 
instead of converging to a constant steady state level of human capital, the human capital 
formed by young individuals will grow unboundedly generation after generation as and when 
the pull of the prospect of migration is powerful enough. On the other hand, if the effect of 
the intertemporal externality of human capital on productivity exists yet is not strong enough 
(that is, if ρ > 0 but 1)1( <++ βρα ), the prospect of migration leads only to a level effect on 
human capital formation in the long run ( ** *h h>% ). 
 
It is noteworthy that Lemma 2, and indeed the very gist of our argument, apply even 
when the prospect of migration avails itself not for each and every generation ad infinitum 
but, rather, for a limited period of time that is nonetheless long enough to lift the level of 




1 tt hh ϕ=+  sufficiently high above the 
threshold level h  and thereby unleashes the power of the intertemporal externality of human 
capital. To elucidate this point, suppose that the door of migration is shut, say as of some 
period t, after the average level of human capital has risen above the level h . As long as 
hht >
~


























hh .   (18) 
 
It is easy to see that the human capital level in (18) thereupon rises without bounds iff 
1)1( >++= βραη  and )1/()/(
~ ηαρα −> hRAht .
8  On the other hand, if 1≤η  or 
                                                 
8 This follows from the fact that when 1>η , the dynamics described by (18) has a unique unstable steady state 
at )1/()/( ηαρα −hRA ; see (9). The condition 1>η  is slightly stronger than the condition needed to guarantee 
an unbounded rise in human capital formation when the prospect of migration is present in each and every 
period; see Lemma 2.    
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/(1 )( / ) ,
t
h A Rh
ρ α ηα −<%  then th
~
 eventually falls below h , from which point onwards the 




h as given in (8). For ease of exposition, we consider in the remainder of our analysis the 
case in which the prospect of migration is present in each and every time period. 
 
We next show that, under the assumption 1>η , migration will deliver a growth gain in 
the long run if the intertemporal externality of human capital formation is large enough.  
 
Proposition 1: If 1>η , then it holds for all sufficiently large t that *tg g n> =% . 
 
Proof: Because the human capital level will surpass the threshold level h  at some point in 






(1 ==+  applies in every 




1 tt hh ϕ=+  for all t and recalling that βραη ++= )1( , the growth 














































































If 1>η , because 1
~
−th  grows without bounds (cf. Lemma 2), and because the exponent of the 
last term is strictly positive, it is clear that *tg g n> =%  holds for all large enough t.  
 
It is worth noting that the dynamic growth gain alluded to in Proposition 1 would not 
have been possible in the absence of a strong enough intertemporal externality of the 
formation of human capital (that is, if it were the case that ρ = 0, or if it were the case that ρ > 
0 but 1<η ). Absent a sufficiently strong intertemporal externality, the human capital formed 
by an individual would have converged to the steady state level **
~
h  and, consequently, the 
14 
 
growth rate would have converged to * *(1 )g p n g n= − < =% . Put differently, the static skill 
gain from the “inducement effect” ( tt hh >
~
) notwithstanding, if the intertemporal externality 
of the human capital formation were absent or present but weak enough, the prospect of 
migration would have actually led to a lower growth rate in the long run. It is also worth 
adding that the long-run growth gain achieved by the economy under the stipulated migration 
regime is in terms of aggregate output, despite of the constant depletion of the economy’s 
better educated labor force due to migration. Therefore, in terms of per-capita output, the 
long-run growth gain would be even larger. 
 
A special case  
 
When 1)1( =++= βραη , both the average level of human capital and the total output 
of the economy, tY , grow in the long run at constant rates. As a matter of fact, it follows from 











where 1)/( )1/()1()1/( >≡Ω −−−−− αβααακα hRA  holds by Assumption 4, and 
 
.)1()/()1(~~ /)1()1/()1(* αβαβρκα −−− Ω−=−== nphRAnpgg t  
 
Then, a long-run growth gain * *g g n> =%  obtains if and only if 1)1( /)1( >Ω− − αβp  (which, 
because 1>Ω , holds for sufficiently small values of p).  
In the general case, the growth rate can increase without bounds because th
~
 does. In the 
special case, however, the growth rate converges to a constant, so the economy exhibits a 
long-run balanced growth path along which output grows at a constant rate. Under the right 
parameter configurations, more precisely if 1)/)(1( )]1(/[)1)(1()1/()1( >− −−−−−−− ααβαβαβκα hRAp , 
this balanced growth rate will be higher than the growth rate in the non-migration economy 
(hence the term “growth gain”).9  
                                                 




4. Welfare repercussions 
Measuring welfare by the consumption level of a representative individual who stays in 
the home country, we can show that the prospect of migration can indeed confer a welfare 
gain in the long run once the growth gain is operative. This welfare comparison assumes 
away but does not neglect the migrants. Individuals who migrate and subject their human 
capital to the returns to human capital of the foreign country, which are higher than those in 
the home country, are strictly better off than the individuals who stay behind. Consequently, a 
welfare gain for the individuals who stay behind implies a welfare gain for all the home 
country individuals. 
 
To prove this claim, we first recall from equation (5) that the per capita consumption 






+ −= tt hRAc , 
 
where we have drawn on the property that Awt =+1  holds for all hht < . From Lemma 1 and 
equation (8) it follows that this consumption level converges to the steady state value
 
 
.)/()1( )1/()1/()1(* βααβαβ αα −−−−−−= RAc      (19) 
 
Analogously, from (13) and 11 ++ = tt ww κ , the per-capita consumption level of a representative 







++ −= ttt hRwc . 
 
Because the level of human capital in the presence of the migration prospect will cross the 












+ −= tt hRhAc    (20) 
                                                                                                                                                        




Under the conditions stipulated in Proposition 1, the human capital level th
~
 will grow 
without bounds. This implies that, as long as 1<κα , which is just slightly stronger than what 
we have assumed in order to ensure that all the individuals can repay their loans, the per 
capita consumption level of an individual who remains in the home country will grow 
without bounds as well. Therefore, in comparison to the non-migration economy in which 
consumption converges to a constant steady state level, the individuals staying in the home 
country will experience a welfare gain in terms of per capita consumption, unless 1=κα  (in 
which case the non-negativity constraint on consumption becomes binding). This welfare 
gain is conferred by the previously discussed long-run growth gain.  
 
The assumption in Proposition 1 that guarantees a long-run growth gain is however 
much stronger than what is needed for a welfare gain to accrue under migration. In fact, even 
if a growth gain is absent, for example if the intertemporal externality of human capital that 
emanates from migration is either too small (as in the case when 1)1( <++= βραη ) or 
even nonexistent (as in the case when the static inducement effect as measured by κ  is too 
weak to render the intertemporal externality effective), a welfare gain is still possible under a 
“controlled” migration. This we illustrate in the remainder of this section under the 
assumption 1<η .  
 
Suppose, first, that the probability of migration p is so small (and, hence, κ  is so close 
to 1) that Assumption 4 fails to hold. In this case, the human capital formed by individuals in 
the presence of migration, th
~
, converges to *
~
h  as given in (16). Because this value is smaller 
than h , the intertemporal externality of human capital formation will never become operative, 
a situation that is essentially equivalent to setting 0=ρ  in our model. Hence, by substituting 
(16) into (20) and setting 0=ρ , we see that 
 
.)/()1(~ )1/()1/()1(* βααβαβ κακα −−−−−−= RAc     (21)  
 
Combining (19) and (21) it follows that 
 




We now note that 1)1( =G , 0)(' >κG  for )1/(1 βκ −< , and 0)(' <κG  for )1/(1 βκ −> . 
These observations imply that there exists a )1/(1* βκ −>  such that 1)( >κG  holds 
whenever *1 κκ <<  which, by the very definition of κ , is satisfied when p is small enough. 
 
We next consider the case in which p  is small enough so that *κκ <  holds, but is still 
high enough so that Assumption 4 holds or, equivalently, that αβαακκ /)1(1)/(' −−−≡> hRA  is 
satisfied (recall that from Assumption 2 it follows that ' 1κ > ).10 Under Assumption 4, the 
human capital formed by individuals in the presence of migration, th
~
, converges to **
~
h  in 
(17). Together with (20) this implies that the consumption level of the individuals who do not 
migrate, tc
~ , converges to the steady state level  
 
.)/()1(~ )1/()1()1/()1()1/()1(* ηραηρβηβ κακα −+−−−−−−= RhAc   (23) 
 
From (19) and (23) we obtain  
 
* * (1 )/(1 ) (1 ) /(1 )/ [(1 ) / (1 )]( / )c c A R hγ α ρ η β ρ ηακ α α κ + − − − −= − −%    (24) 
 
where [ ])1)(1(/)1( ηβαβαργ −−−−= . Using (23) and (16), we can rewrite the condition 
**~ cc >  as .)
~
/()( )1/()1(* ηρβκ −−> hhG
 
Because of hh >*
~
 (due to Assumption 4) and 1<η , 
this inequality is satisfied whenever its left-hand side, )(κG , is strictly larger than 1. Because 
we have already shown that 1)( >κG  holds whenever *1 ,κ κ< <  it follows that **~ cc >  
holds for all p such that *' κκκ <<  is satisfied.  
 
This last result illustrates that even if the intertemporal externality of human capital is 
not large enough to foster a long-run growth gain, the long-run level effect on human capital 
formation can still confer a welfare gain upon the individuals who stay behind in the home 
country. The fact that this finding holds even when the “pull” of the inducement effect (as 
                                                 
10  From )1/(1* βκ −>  and ' 1 (1 )/( / ) ,A R h α β ακ α − − −=  it is easy to see that the parameter space for which 
*' κκ <  holds is nonempty.  
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measured by κ ) is too small so that it fails to trigger the intertemporal externality altogether 
suggests that the result of a welfare gain from migration is quite robust. 
 
5. The case of heterogeneous individuals 
It might be argued that so far our analysis has omitted an important consideration, 
namely that often it is the better educated individuals who succeed in getting job offers from 
developed countries. If such is the case, migration would impose a negative externality on 
non-migrants as it causes the average level of human capital to decline. Obviously, for this 
perspective to be studied, a model that allows for heterogeneity is needed. In this section we 
discuss a variant of our model that is amenable to such a study. We assume that individuals 
can be of two types: low-skill and high-skill. The difference in types is reflected by the high-
skill individuals having a higher productivity in acquiring human capital than the low-skill 
individuals. Furthermore, we assume that only the high-skill individuals, who in equilibrium 
form more human capital, are able to migrate. Although this is a strong assumption, it is the 
very assumption that generates the strongest negative externality through migration. We seek 
to demonstrate that even in such a setting, the incentives created by the prospect of migrating 
to a high-income country may result in a growth gain, as well as in a consequent welfare gain. 
 
Suppose that in each generation a fraction )1,0(∈δ  of individuals has low skills, 
whereas the complementary fraction δ−1  has high skills. Individuals of the high skill type 
have the same production function for human capital as in (1). Individuals of the low skill 
type have the human capital production function 
 
βα
λ ttt heh =+1  
 
where 10 << λ . Individuals know their types when in the first period of their life they make 
their human capital acquisition decisions. This implies that those who have low skills (and, 
by assumption, are aware of that) correctly anticipate that they will not be able to migrate. 
Denoting again the unconditional probability of an individual migrating by p, we would have 
to assume that δ−≤ 1p . Furthermore, it follows that the conditional probability of a high-
skill individual migrating is )1/(* δ−= pp , whereas the conditional probability of a low-




We start with the case of no migration. Analogously to Section 2, absent a prospect of 
migration, a high-skill individual of generation t chooses to form the human capital level 
/(1 ) /(1 )
1 1( / )t t th w R H
α α β αα − −+ += , where tH is the average level of human capital in the home 
country in period t. On the other hand, low-skill individuals 
choose /(1 ) /(1 )1 1( / )t t th w R H
α α β ααλ − −+ += . Therefore, the evolution of the average level of 


































Λ ≥   
   (25) 
 
where 11 )1/( <+−=Λ −ααδλδ . As in the case of homogeneous individuals, we assume that 
the threshold level of human capital at which the intertemporal externality sets in is higher 
than the steady state value rendered by (25) without the externality (that is, the second line of 
(25)).11 Formally, this means that )1/()1/()1( )/( βααβαα α −−−−−Λ> RAh . 
 
We now allow for migration. With regard to high-skill individuals, equations (10) - (14) 






1 )1( +++ +−= ttt wpwpw  and 
reformulate Assumption 3 as ακκ /11 *** ≤+−≡ pp . For low-skill individuals, however, 
we have to reckon that they are aware of the fact that they will not be able to migrate. Hence, 
they know that they will be earning the domestic wage 1+tw  for sure and, therefore, they 
behave as in the no-migration case, choosing the human capital level 
/(1 ) /(1 )
1 1( / )t t th w R H
α α β ααλ − −+ += . Combining these observations, we find that the average level 



































                                                 
11 For a comparison with the case of homogeneous individuals, see Assumption 2. 
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where )1/()1/(** ))(1( αααα δλκδ −− +−=Λ . We note that 1>κ  implies that 1* >κ  which, in turn, 






































   (26) 
 
and Assumption 4 translates into hRA >Λ −−−−− )1/()1/()1(* )/()( βααβαα α . 
 
From a comparison of equations (25) and (26) with equations (7) and (15), respectively, 
it becomes apparent that introducing heterogeneity does not qualitatively change any of the 
results of Section 3. In particular, under the appropriate reformulation of Assumptions 2 - 4 as 
mentioned above, results analogous to Lemma 2 and to Proposition 1 can be obtained. This 
implies that the growth gain alluded to in the title of the paper is not a consequence of the 
assumption of a homogeneous workforce. Finally, as we have shown in Section 4, at least in 
the case where the growth gain is operative, that is, at least in the case where the 
intertemporal externality is strong enough, this growth gain confers a welfare gain also upon 
all the individuals who do not migrate. It is straightforward to verify that this result carries 
over to the case of heterogeneous individuals. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Complementing Stark and Wang (2002), we have provided conditions under which, in a 
dynamic setting with sufficiently large intertemporal human capital externalities, the gains to 
a developing country that accrue from the inducement effect of the prospect of migration for 
the formation of human capital include long-term economic growth. The growth gains are 
conferred when the migration door is opened period by period, and even if it is shut after a 
finite number of periods. In line with the results of Stark and Wang (2002) for the static, one 
period analysis, we showed, in the dynamic setting studied in the current paper, that there are 
welfare gains to all, migrants and non-migrants alike, provided that the probability of 
migration is relatively small. Perhaps the most powerful message of the current paper is that 
when the intertemporal spillover effect of the current human capital on future productivity is 
sufficiently strong, the response of individuals to the prospect of migration is a catalyst of 
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long-run growth. Furthermore, when the spillover effect of the prospect of migration confers 
a long-run growth gain in the home country, even a temporary opening up to migration can 
lead to long-lasting beneficial consequences, both for growth and for welfare.  
 
As noted in the introduction, the main idea of our earlier work is that the prospect of 
migration from a developing country to a developed country changes not only the set of 
opportunities but also the structure of the incentives that individuals face: higher prospective 
returns to human capital in a developed country induce more human capital formation in a 
developing country. In the present paper we have gone beyond our original idea. We have 
argued that the prospect of migration reshapes the environment for intertemporal human 
capital formation in the developing country: not only does it strengthen the incentives to form 
human capital in the present; it also makes the prevailing human capital infrastructure for the 





Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1:  
 
Assumption 2 is equivalent to )()( hhh ϕφ => , that is, the graph of (7) at h  is below 
the 45 degree line. Depending on the size of the intertemporal externality, ρ , and hence on 
the magnitude of η , there are three possibilities (see Figure 1).  
 
First, if 1<η  (when the intertemporal externality is relatively small), )(⋅ϕ  is concave 
and has a unique stable steady state. Denoting the steady state in (9) in this case of 1<η  as 
**
1h , it follows from 
*)1/()/( hRAh => −− βααα that hhh << *
**
1 . Thus, the transition function 
)()( tt hhH φ=  for hht <  observes )()( hhh ϕφ => ; and )()( tt hhH ϕ=  for hht ≥  is 
concave and never intersects the 45 degree line again (because hhh << *
**
1 ). Therefore, 
)(1 tt hHh =+  has a unique stable steady state at 
*
h over the entire domain.  
 
Second, if 1=η  (the special case), )(⋅ϕ  is linear with a slope )1/()/( ααρα −hRA  that is 
less than 1 because )1/()/( βααα −−> RAh . Thus, the transition function )()( tt hhH φ=  for 
hht <  observes )()( hhh ϕφ => ; and )()( tt hhH ϕ=  for hht ≥  is linear with a slope of 
less than 1. Therefore, )(1 tt hHh =+  has a unique stable steady state at 
*
h  over the entire 
domain. 
 
Third, if 1>η  (when the intertemporal externality is relatively large), )(⋅ϕ  is convex 
and the unique steady state is unstable. Denoting the steady state in (9) in this case of 1>η  
as 
**
2h , it follows from 
)1/()/( βααα −−> RAh  that 
***
2 hhh >> . Thus, the transition function 
)()( tt hhH φ=  for hht <  satisfies )()( hhh ϕφ => ; and )()( tt hhH ϕ=  for hht ≥  is convex 
and intersects the 45 degree line from below at 
**
2h . Therefore, )(1 tt hHh =+  has a stable 
steady state at *h  and an unstable steady state at 
**
2h  as determined in (9). It then follows 
that th  converges to 
*
h  as long as 
)1/(**
20 )/(




The preceding analyses of the three possibilities complete the proof.  
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Appendix B. The case of *)1/()/( hRAh =< −− βααα   
 
B.1. The human capital dynamics in the closed economy  
 
In the case *,h h<  the threshold level of human capital for the intertemporal externality 
is relatively low, and Assumption 2 is violated. The characterization of the human capital 
dynamics can once again be divided into three sub-cases, depending on the size of the 
intertemporal externality, ρ . Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, it is easy to show that the 
human capital dynamics is characterized as follows (and as illustrated in Figure 3). 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Sub-case B.1.1: If 1<η  (the intertemporal externality is small) 
 
In this sub-case, the transition function )()( tt hhH φ=  is above the 45 degree line for 
hht < , and for hht ≥ , )()( tt hhH ϕ=  is concave and intersects the 45 degree line from 
above at 
**
1h , which satisfies 
**
1h hh >>
* . Therefore, )(1 tt hHh =+  
has a unique stable 
steady state at 
**
1h over the entire domain.  
 
Sub-case B.1.2: If 1>η  (the intertemporal externality is large) 
 
In this sub-case, the transition function )()( tt hhH φ=  is above the 45 degree line for 
hht < , and for hht ≥ , )()( tt hhH ϕ=  is convex and never intersects the 45 degree line. 
Therefore, )( thH  does not have an interior steady state.  
 
Sub-case B.1.3: If 1=η  (the special case) 
 
In this sub-case, the transition function )()( tt hhH φ=  is above the 45 degree line for 
hht < , and for hht ≥ , )()( tt hhH ϕ=  is linear with a slope greater than 1. Therefore, )( thH  




In sum: when )1/()/( βααα −−< RAh  holds, it will be possible for the human capital level 
in the closed economy to take off onto a path of unbounded growth if 1≥η , but it will 
converge to a constant steady state level that is greater than h  if 1<η . In any event, the level 
of human capital will be above the threshold level h , and hence, the intertemporal externality 
in human capital formation will be operative in the long run. 
 
B.2. The growth and welfare effects of migration 
 
Because *)1/()/( hRAh =< −− βααα  holds in the closed economy, Assumption 4 is 
automatically satisfied under any migration regime with 1>κ , which shifts the phase 
diagram in Figure 3 upwards. By assuming, without loss of generality, that the human capital 




































Recalling the transition functions for human capital with migration and without migration, 
)(~ ⋅ϕ  and )(⋅ϕ , respectively, it follows that 11 /
~
−− tt hh  increases without bounds when 
1)1( ≥++= βραη . Therefore, if 1≥η , then it follows that tt gg >
~  holds for all sufficiently 
large t. In other words, the growth gain stated in Proposition 1 also carries over to the case 
*)1/()/( hRAh =< −− βααα . 
 







































When 1≥η , because tt hh /
~
 increases without bounds, 11
~
++ > tt cc  will hold for sufficient large 
t. On the other hand, when 1<η , th
~
 and th  converge to the steady states in (17) and (9), 




).(ˆ)]1/()1[(/~ )1/()1(** κκακα ηρα Gcc ≡−−= −+
 
 
Noting that 1)1(ˆ =G  and 0)1('ˆ >G , it follows that 1)(ˆ >κG  or, equivalently, **~ cc > , hold 
for κ  sufficiently close to 1 or, equivalently, p  sufficiently close to 0. Therefore, the welfare 
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Figure 1: The phase diagram of the human capital dynamics in the benchmark economy 
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Figure 3: The phase diagram of the human capital dynamics in the benchmark economy 
(when )1/()/( βααα −−< RAh ) 
